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Abstract 
Gas-fired power plants are increasingly used in the production of electricity, which in turn makes them 
a relevant part of the gas demand. In this paper, we investigate whether the current designs of gas and 
power markets are robust to the relatively new link between industries. Specifically, we study the 
cross-industry efficiency losses associated with designs aimed at increasing liquidity by limiting the 
amount of network services allocated through markets. In the short run, reducing the set of 
transmission services priced in one market (say gas) affects the use of transmission in the other market 
(say power). This may result in inefficiencies that should be accounted for when deciding on the 
network services to be allocated through market arrangements in each industry. We also identify long-
term effects of such design strategies: the allocation of gas pipeline storage and transmission services 
without preference representation may weaken localization signals for power plants investment. In 
addition, lack of harmonization of market designs may raise barriers to network investment.  
Keywords 
Market design; Gas and power interaction; Network economics.  
1. Introduction*
Power and gas industries are increasingly linked. Gas-ﬁred power plants are
increasingly used in the generation of electricity, and will be used even more
in the future to back up intermittent generation. Hence, gas-ﬁred power
plants have become relevant users of the gas system, which motivates the
strong link between industries. Nonetheless, despite of the increased inter-
action between gas and electricity markets, most of the literature has dealt
with these two industries separately.
In the gas industry, works dealing with market design aspects can be or-
ganized under three broad headers1. The ﬁrst group of works analyzes the
role of long-term contracts, see for instance Mulherin (1986) or Masten and
Crocker (1985). The second group analyzes short-term regulatory aspects as-
sociated with the existence of a central network operator, see for instance La-
puerta and Moselle (2002) or Lapuerta (2003). More recently, a third stream
of literature began to discuss diﬀerent institutional arrangements for gas
transmission, Correlje et al. (2012), and their impact on the gas market,
Ruﬀ (2012), Makholm (2012) or Vazquez et al. (2012) which aims to link
the two former streams of literature.
In the electricity industry, we ﬁnd similar lines of regulatory research2. The
contracting literature is in this case related to the design of organized mar-
kets; see for instance Sioshansi (2008) for a review in on the literature dealing
with the design of mechanisms for market arrangements. Along the lines of
gas industry literature, the short-term regulatory issues related to network
coordination have been extensively analyzed, see for instance Stoft (2002) for
a general description. A third stream of the literature copes with the institu-
tional setting of power markets, Joskow and Schmalensee (1983), Glachant
and Finon (2000), Rious et al. (2008).
In that view, it seems sensible to investigate whether the designs of gas
and power markets are robust to the relatively new link between industries.
Gas and electricity market interacts, and their interaction depends on how
markets are designed. In both industries, not only have market designs to
address the coordination between the demand and oﬀer of commodity prod-
ucts, but also the coordination of network operation. Hence, gas and power
market designs deﬁnes how network constraints are coordinated with com-
*The authors are grateful to Arthur Henriot for signiﬁcant feedback during the prepa-
ration of this manuscript. They are also grateful to Jean-Michel Glachant for fruitful
discussions.
1We do not consider here the research line that focuses on market structure and
pricing, including modeling of strategic behavior, assuming a certain market design; see
for instance Holtz et al. (2008).
2As in gas market literature, one also ﬁnds literature coping with strategic behavior
issues, see for instance Ventosa et al. (2005) for a review.
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modity trading. In this regard, on the one hand, there is a wide agreement
that power markets must be based on the existence of a Transmission Sys-
tem Operator3 (TSO). But such agreement is not found in gas industries,
as it is possible to ﬁnd gas market designs that build on long-term pipeline
contracting (as the US market, see Makholm (2012) for a detailed descrip-
tion). In this case, the coordination of gas networks with commodity trading
is decided on by market players (instead of by the interaction among TSOs
and market players), and thus the possibility to design markets with the aim
of increasing liquidity by reducing the set of networks services oﬀered in the
market is limited. As both networks and network users are market players,
the room for design is signiﬁcantly reduced. Therefore, this paper will be
considering only gas market arrangements built on the existence of a TSO4.
One of the most used motivations for the implementation of TSOs has to
do with the interaction between networks and commodities in the short run.
Gas and power networks are characterized by complex technical character-
istics, so ensuring the security of the system operation typically involves a
tight coordination between commodity and network services. As the char-
acteristics of the network services needed to operate gas and power systems
are signiﬁcantly complex, they are the source of severe transaction costs (see
for instance Glachant (2002) for the analysis of asset speciﬁcity in several
network industries). This in turn implies that market arrangements may be
highly ineﬃcient, and hence some of those services are not traded by market
participants but managed by the TSO. Following the power markets litera-
ture, e.g. Stoft (2002), we will refer to these services as ancillary services.
Providing a general deﬁnition of ancillary services in gas and power markets
is not an easy task, but such deﬁnition plays a central role in the design
of those markets. One possible reasoning comes from the observation that
gas and power industries are made up of considerably speciﬁc assets. This
complicates the implementation of market arrangements. But as shown in
Riordan and Williamson (1985) in a general context, asset speciﬁcity is ulti-
mately a design variable, and it is possible to reduce speciﬁcity at the cost of
reducing eﬃciency. When applied to gas and power sectors, the deﬁnition of
ancillary services can be associated with this strategy of reducing speciﬁcity
to allow market arrangements.
We will not aim at deﬁning generally these ancillary services. Instead, the
strategy we pursue in this paper is to deﬁne the list of services actually traded
by market players. The rest of network services will be considered ancillary
services (we implicitly assume that they are characterized by prohibitively
large transaction costs). Put it diﬀerently, we will deﬁne the network con-
straints that are taken into account when clearing each market. The gap
3A regulated agent in charge of the network operation.
4Examples of such gas market design are Australian and European gas industries.
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between the representation of network constraints and the physical charac-
teristics of the market will be made up of ancillary services5. To do so, we will
assume that all short-term trading may be represented by a single auction
for each market (i.e. a single auction for the gas market and an additional
single auction for the power market). In this regard, we will not discuss ben-
eﬁts and drawbacks of implementing alternative designs (e.g. a sequence of
simpler auctions). We will consider that, given the deﬁnition of ancillary ser-
vices, all designs are equivalent in terms of eﬃciency to the single-auction
representation, see Vazquez (2003) for a detailed discussion.
In that view, we use the auction representation to characterize the eﬃcient
outcome of short-term gas and power trading. Our deﬁnition of eﬃciency is
an auction outcome that allocates services to the players that value them
most, see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) or Wilson (1993) for a general
treatment of mechanism eﬃciency deﬁnitions. The single-auction represen-
tation in turn relies on assuming no transaction costs, no private information,
no uncertainty and no strategic behavior. Consequently, we place the anal-
ysis of both gas and power industries close to the spirit of nodal pricing
introduced by Schweppe et al. (1988).
We then use the auction outcomes to study the diﬃculties associated with
several measures aimed at reducing the speciﬁcity of gas and power assets.
The logic for this is that, as we will show, many of the drawbacks of such
measures remain hidden when analyzing each industry separately, and they
should be taken into account when deciding on the set of ancillary services.
In that view, we do not analyze potential beneﬁts associated with sacriﬁcing
eﬃciency to reduce speciﬁcity. Our study is aimed at identifying additional
costs of those measures that are associated with the interaction of gas and
power markets.
Two fundamental interactions will be studied. On the one hand, ineﬃcient
allocation of transmission services (i.e. not according to players' preferences)
in one industry (say gas) aﬀects the results of the other industry (say elec-
tricity). For instance, if gas transmission is cheaper due to some regulatory
measure than power transmission, there will be more trades using gas trans-
mission than in the optimal solution (optimality deﬁned as the result of the
auction). Or if pipeline line-pack storage6 is allocated without costs, there
will be cross-subsidies of the gas market to the power market. Put it diﬀer-
ently, if line-pack services7 are valuable in the optimal solution, but they are
costless in a certain market design, the costs of trading gas are sub-optimal.
5The design of mechanisms to allocate ancillary services is beyond the scope of this
paper.
6The capability of a pipeline to store gas inside it
7Line-pack services are the diﬀerent kinds of services (economic functions) that the
use of line-pack storage may provide. For instance, line-pack services include balancing
the ﬂows injected and withdrawn at diﬀerent points in time.
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As gas is an input for power markets, power markets will not behave as in
the optimal solution.
Finally, we analyze the dynamic implications of the previous results. Short-
term mechanisms are eﬀective long-term signals. When such signals are dis-
torted, there are relevant long-term eﬀects both in the commodity and in
the network sides of the market. We identify three main long-term eﬀects.
First, free gas ﬂexibility may weaken localization signals for power plants
investment. Second, transmission services without representation of players'
preferences may also weaken signals for power plants localization. And third,
lack of harmonization of market designs may raise barriers to investment.
After the introduction, section 2 is devoted to describe the rules to deal with
the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and liquidity. Section 3 provides an overview
of the methodology used in this paper, which is based on a single-auction
representation. Section 4 develops the analysis of the drawbacks of some
current regulations, by comparing them to the results of the single-auction
representation. Section 5 describes the dynamic implications of the previous
results, and section 6 collects our conclusions. The Appendix deﬁnes the
single-auction representation of both gas and power markets.
2. Efficient clearing, liquidity and pricing of network
services
To organize the gas industry transactions on a market base, a gas commodity
has to be deﬁned prior to the trade. This is done through the deﬁnition of
a set of characteristics of gas (caloriﬁc power, pressure...), the time horizon
and location of injection/delivery. To do so, the transmission infrastructures
play a critical role. But gas and power networks operation is characterized
by tight technical constraints. Thus, the contracting architecture required to
implement the commodity delivery at diﬀerent points of the network, within
diﬀerent time scopes, must be complex. This is the source of signiﬁcant trans-
action costs, Williamson (1975), Williamson (1983) and Williamson (1985).
In order to reduce network speciﬁcity, and hence transaction costs, it is pos-
sible to simplify the actual network to broaden the trading space (at the
cost of reducing eﬃciency), Riordan and Williamson (1985). Thus, many gas
and power markets are build on the idea of "commercial networks". Many
systems have created a set of arrangements where some key transmission
services are socialized among players. This allows increasing the homogene-
ity of trading places and dealing with complex technical characteristics. The
commercial network can be deﬁned as this reduced set of network services
taken into account by market players in their commodity trade. The remain-
ing diﬀerences between the commercial network and the physical network
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are socialized through the ancillary services.
2.1. Regulatory measures aimed to simplify the gas and
power networks
The network operator can choose to reduce the speciﬁcity of each feasible
trade. If the network operator simpliﬁes the individual spatial characteristics
of each trade, the spatial diﬃculties to trade in the network zone are reduced,
and the number of market players trading the same product increases. The
same idea is pursued when the TSO simpliﬁes the temporal characteristics of
gas or power by deﬁning longer periods in which injections and withdrawals
are considered simultaneous. That simpliﬁcation strategy implies that several
services will be part of the ancillary services, and hence will be socialized. We
will next describe this simpliﬁcation of the network analyzing the implicit
spatial and temporal ﬂexibility that diﬀerent regulations may associate with
the commodity deﬁnition.
2.1.1. Spatial ﬂexibility
A point-to-point gas transmission arrangement could be thought of as the
less simpliﬁed option for wholesale gas trade, where most of the actual phys-
ical characteristics of each trade are to be expressed in that trade. It is
consequently the arrangement with the most limited trading area. This is
the typical scheme implemented in the US and Australian gas markets. Al-
though the US market is characterized by the absence of a TSO, the Aus-
tralian market is based on point-to-point transmission allocated through an
auction. In the EU, on the other hand, one ﬁnds a diﬀerent capacity deﬁni-
tion: the entry/exit system. It consists in selling separately the right to enter
and exit the system, and the rest of spatial characteristics of the network are
allocated implicitly. Thus, gas market players only reveal preferences on the
right to enter and exit the gas systems. Within the system, all injections and
withdrawals are considered to have the same price. In that view, the design
implies free spatial ﬂexibility and thus considers a larger part of network
services as ancillary services.
The power-system version of point-to point transmission is often called nodal
pricing, which is also the preferred design in USA. It can be though of as
a combinatorial auction that allows bids specifying additional conditions to
just price-quantity pairs. The corresponding market clearing, thus, must be
done by solving some (more or less) complex optimization problem. But one
also ﬁnds measures to reduce speciﬁcity in power markets, especially in the
EU. The predominant design in Europe is to deﬁne spot markets as a se-
quence simple auctions, where power producers send bids specifying the price
5
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required for selling each possible quantity, and the market is cleared simply
by intersecting the supply and demand curves. These simple auctions are
complemented with congestion management mechanisms. In that view, as
part of those congestion management services are often socialized among a
certain group of network users, the complete scheme implies larger spatial
ﬂexibility than nodal pricing schemes. For instance, one often ﬁnds mech-
anisms where the supply side oﬀers according to their preferences but the
costs are socialized.
2.1.2. Temporal ﬂexibility
The speciﬁcity of gas and power trade may also be reduced by adding to
the deﬁnition of the commercial network a certain ﬂexibility in the time of
injection/withdrawal. In this type of trading arrangement, the deﬁnition of
the commercial network allows injections and withdrawals between times
T1 and Tmax without additional costs or diﬃculties for the traders. Put it
diﬀerently, transmission services between T1 and Tmax have the same cost
from the point of view of the traders as network users. Therefore, players
may inject in and withdraw from the system at diﬀerent periods without
aﬀecting the market characteristics and value of their trades. Consequently,
the temporal speciﬁcity of gas and power ﬂows is reduced.
Most of the gas market designs based on TSOs rely on a certain level of
temporal ﬂexibility, as the storage ability of gas systems is not as limited
as in power networks. For instance, it is possible to ﬁnd designs based on
deﬁning gas as a daily product: during the day, all injections and withdrawals
have the same price. Put it diﬀerently, markets do not see any temporal
characteristic of the gas within the day, and the balancing of injections and
withdrawals are the responsibility of TSOs.
On the other hand, there are a variety of electricity spot market designs.
But in every case, power networks are characterized by signiﬁcantly limited
storage capability. In that view, TSOs need to coordinate tightly production
and consumption in order to secure the system operation. To do so, they
need to anticipate to some extent the system requirements. The time frame
deﬁned by the temporal characteristics of the products managed by TSOs
deﬁne the temporal ﬂexibility given in the market. For instance, if TSOs buy
all services they need one year in advance (so that, for instance, they can
respond to any situation after the day-ahead market), all temporal charac-
teristics of electricity after the day-ahead market are socialized. On the other
hand, if TSOs buy services only twenty minutes in advance, markets need
to coordinate the operation up to that point. This coordination will be done
according to market preferences (contrary to yearly reserves), at the cost of
increased transaction costs.
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2.2. Scope of the analysis
When a certain power or gas system oﬀers both ample temporal and spatial
ﬂexibility for gas trade, the simpliﬁcation increases the liquidity of gas trade
by facilitating the access to transmission services. Under this design, the
commercial transmission services (the ones that characterize the commer-
cial network) may be viewed as rights to access an enlarged trading space,
with possibly large temporal and spatial ﬂexibility. This creates a regulated
market liquidity.
In this paper, we show that the eﬀects of that regulated liquidity are not
limited to a single industry. Enlarging the trading space in one industry
aﬀects the eﬃciency of the other industry. Therefore, when analyzing the
trade-oﬀ eﬃciency/liquidity, one needs to consider such cross-industry ef-
fects. To analyze these eﬀects, this paper considers a hypothetical situation
where minimal ﬂexibility is given in the deﬁnition of the commodity. With
that benchmark, we will analyze the eﬀects of several regulatory rules found
in power and gas markets.
To do so, we begin by considering a situation where gas and power markets
are cleared according to a single, combinatorial auction (one auction for
each market). We choose a representation based on combinatorial auctions to
make explicit that market participants will be deciding on all services deﬁned
in such auction and that TSOs are deciding on any service not represented
in it.
Our procedure is as follows:
• We deﬁne the eﬃcient allocation as the result of the clearing process
for the combinatorial auction
• We analyze the eﬀects of several regulatory measures on the results
of the hypothetical auctions. Such eﬀects are interpreted as eﬀects on
allocation eﬃciency
• We analyze the long-term eﬀects of the previous measures
The study developed in this paper is associated with short-term trading.
Speciﬁcally, we will analyze trading from a day-ahead horizon until the point
in time when the TSO takes over control of the network for security purposes.
All trading in that interval will be modeled by the results of a combinatorial
auction. We assume, in that context, that any alternative auction design for
that (including the trades taking place within-day) will be equally eﬃcient.
In that view, our methodology does not allow studying the eﬀects on network
allocation of additional elements, e.g. private information or risk aversion.
We deﬁne the day-ahead auctions as a representation of a certain set of mech-
anisms aimed at allocating network services through market arrangements.
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Under such hypotheses, we analyze short-term gas-electricity interactions.
3. Auctions for power and gas
The auctions considered in this paper are implicit auctions: players only bid
for commodities and network services are allocated according to commodity
bids. In the case of power markets, we consider combinatorial auctions along
the lines of Hobbs et al. (2001). Loosely, they proposed more or less detailed
unit-commitment models as candidates to clear short-term electricity mar-
kets8, see for instance O'Neill et al. (2003) or Hogan and Ring (2003). The
proposal of this paper is close to the one in Barquín and Vazquez (2008). In
the case of gas markets, we will use the auction proposed in Vazquez and
Hallack (2012).
The bids are only for trades in the commodities. That is, players bid for gas
and power injections and withdrawals, and network services are allocated by
the clearing algorithm. No uncertainty or strategic behavior is considered.
Gas and power commodities (and hence the corresponding network services)
are parameterized by t, the time unit that deﬁnes the duration of the product.
All bids are send before the ﬁrst period represented in the auction. For
instance, if t represents an hour, gas and power commodities are hourly
products (and so are network services) and the auction takes place one day
before delivery, so that players send bids for the next twenty-four hours.
Under the assumptions of this paper, an implicit auction taking account of
network constraints provides an eﬃcient allocation. Any other auction de-
sign strategy (e.g. a design based on a sequence of auctions, or an iterative
auction) is equivalent in terms of eﬃciency, as long as the deﬁnition of the
network services represented in the auction is the same. The auctioneer re-
ceives the bids and clears the market. To do so, the auctioneer uses the bids
as input to an optimization problem that represents the operation of the
corresponding network. In that view, it is a uniform-price auction. For the
sake of simplicity, we will consider that all gas storage facilities are managed
by market players. Hence, they will be oﬀered implicitly in the auction bids.
In that view, all storage is allocated according to market preferences. When
this is not the case, i.e. some storage capacity is managed by TSOs, there will
be additional costs to the ones described below, but they will be similar to
the costs associated with suboptimal pricing of line-pack storage described
below. We will be using three general results (the detailed description of the
algorithms and their properties are collected in the Appendix):
8This design strategy is rather popular in the US, being the option chosen e.g. by
PJM, NY...
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Result 1: The uniform price of both gas and power auctions is equal to the
marginal bids.
The uniform price of both auctions makes the marginal utility of production
equal to the marginal utility of consumption. Such marginal utilities are
deﬁned by the oﬀer and demand curves at each network node and point in
time, which in turn are made up of the bids of market players. This result
is obtained in the Appendix, and represented in equations (1)(2) for the
power auction and (9)(10) for the gas auction.
Result 2: The price of transmission resulting from both auctions is given by
the price diﬀerences along the network.
In the power clearing algorithm, these price diﬀerences are made up of two
terms: a) the congestion costs, given by the Lagrange multiplier of the ﬂow
limit constraints, and b) and the power-ﬂow costs, given by the multiplier
of the power-ﬂow equations. The latter is a typical characteristic of power
ﬂows: as electricity cannot be conﬁned in a certain path, when any line of
the network is congested, ﬂow changes in any line aﬀect transmission costs
in all lines of the network. In the gas clearing algorithm, price diﬀerences
have a diﬀerent nature. Gas ﬂow paths, contrary to electricity, can be con-
trolled, so those price diﬀerences should be associated just with congestion
rents. However, we take account of line-pack storage, so in fact such price
diﬀerences measure the trade-oﬀ between line-pack and transmission. This
result is obtained in the Appendix, and represented by equation (3) for the
power auction, and equation (12) for the gas auction.
Result 3: For the gas network, the auction price of line-pack storage at
each network node is given by the price diﬀerences, between two consecutive
periods, at each point of the network.
This result is complementary to the gas part of the previous result. The gas
clearing algorithm represents the trade-oﬀ between transmission and line-
pack. The previous result described the pricing of transmission services, and
this one represents the pricing of line-pack services. In the Appendix we also
show that the gas auction is cleared so that the value of line-pack equals the
value of transmission services, being both values implicit in players' bids, see
equation (B.2). This result is obtained in the Appendix, and represented by
equation (13).
4. Effects of liquidity measures
This section studies the eﬀects of suboptimal pricing of transmission services.
The optimal pricing is deﬁned through the results described in the previous
section. The motivation for suboptimal pricing was given in 2. Hence, the
9
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aim of this section is showing the cross-industry costs of suboptimal pricing.
Its possible beneﬁts, e.g. those associated with reduced transaction costs,
and the quantitative assessment are beyond the scope of this paper.
4.1. Measures affecting the pricing of transmission services
We begin by illustrating the eﬀects of suboptimal transmission pricing using
a simple example. To do so, we consider the following particular applications
of the previous results:
(R1G: Result 1Gas market)
Ci,∗t represents the last cleared bid of the aggregate bid curve for withdrawals
in the gas auction, at point i and time t. The symbol (∗) denotes marginal
point. W i,∗t represents the corresponding quantity speciﬁed in the bid. Thus,
the marginal utility expressed in players' bids will be given by
∂Ci,∗t
∂W i,∗t
. Con-
sequently, using (Result 1 ),
∂Ci,∗t
∂W i,∗t
= pii,gt , where pi
i,g
t is the gas auction price
at point i and time t.
(R1P: Result 1Power market)
Oj,∗t represents the last cleared bid of the aggregate bid curve for production
in the power auction, at point j and time t. The symbol (∗) denotes the
marginal point. P j,∗t represents the corresponding quantity speciﬁed in the
bid. Thus, the marginal utility expressed in players' bids will be given by
∂Oj,∗t
∂P j,∗t
. Consequently, using (Result 1 ),
∂Oj,∗t
∂P j,∗t
= pij,pt , where pi
j,p
t is the power
auction price at point j and time t.
(R2G: Result 2Gas market)
The price of transporting gas from point i to point j at time t will be denoted
by µi−j,F,gt . Using (Result 2 ) and assuming no congestion in the pipeline, the
transport price is given by the price diﬀerence, µi−j,F,gt = pi
i,g
t − pij,gt .
(R2P: Result 2Power market)
Analogously, the price of transporting power from point i to point j at time
t will be denoted by µi−j,F,pt . Using (Result 2 ) and assuming no congestion
in the power network, the transport price is given by the price diﬀerence,
µi−j,F,pt = pi
i,p
t − pij,pt .
4.1.1. An example
Assume that the set of nodes for the two networks are the same. Let us
consider the following possibilities.
10
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(Trade A): The ﬁrst situation consists in:
• A power producer buys gas at node i at a price given by the marginal
bid at the auction:
∂Ci,∗t
∂W i,∗t
• After that, the power producer transports the gas in the same period to
the node j. The price for such trade is given by the value of transport
determined by the gas auction (we assume that the pipeline is not
congested): µi−j,F,gt
• Finally, the power producer sells electricity produced with the gas at
node j:
∂Oj,∗t
∂P j,∗t
The unit revenue of the set of trades (assuming for the sake of simplicity
that the heat rate of the plant is equal to one) is thus given by
unit revenue(A) = − ∂C
i,∗
t
∂W i,∗t
+ µi−j,F,gt +
∂Oj,∗t
∂P j,∗t
Using the previous results R1G, R2G and R1P in the expression for the unit
revenue, we have that
unit revenue(A) = pij,pt − pij,gt
That is, the unit revenue for the trade is equal to the diﬀerence between the
power price at node j and the gas price at node j.
(Trade B): The second situation consists in:
• A power producer buys gas at node i at a price given by the marginal
bid at the auction:
∂Ci,∗t
∂W i,∗t
• Then, the power producer transports electricity from node i to node j
(assuming that the power line is not congested): µi−j,F,pt
• After that, the power producer sells electricity at node j: ∂O
j,∗
t
∂P j,∗t
The unit revenue of the set of trades (assuming again that the heat rate of
the plant is equal to one) is given by
unit revenue(B) = − ∂C
i,∗
t
∂W i,∗t
+ µi−j,F,pt +
∂Oj,∗t
∂P j,∗t
Using the previous results R1G, R2P and R1P in the expression for the unit
revenue, we have that
unit revenue(B) = pii,pt − pii,gt
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That is, the unit revenue for the trade is equal to the diﬀerence between the
power price at node i and the gas price at node i.
Suboptimal transmission pricing. It is possible that network allocation
follows diﬀerent rules than the ones described by the auction. Consider the
case of postage stamp pricing in the gas system9. This implies that no trans-
mission constraint is considered when clearing the market. As the gas auction
is not cleared according to players' preferences (because transmission is not
represented), there are situations where transporting gas is cheaper than
transporting electricity. For instance, assume the postage stamp mechanism
implies that the gas price is the average of the hypothetical gas auction
described so far. Thus, the postage stamp price would be
piPS,pt =
1
N
N∑
k=1
pik,gt
A possible situation would be characterized by pij,gt < pi
PS,p
t < pi
i,g
t . Thus,
under postage stamp pricing, the unit revenue associated with the trade A
would be higher (pij,gt < pi
PS,p
t ) and the unit revenue of trade B would be
lower (piPS,pt < pi
i,g
t ).
4.1.2. General lessons from the example
In the example above, there are more trades using gas transmission (Trade A)
than the in eﬃcient solution. This in turn implies that part of the gas market
(the part not using gas transmission) is subsidizing the part of the market
actually transporting. Hence, it is implicitly providing subsidies to the power
market, as trades that should be done by transporting electricity are done
by transporting gas. One may also ﬁnd situations with prices that make
cheaper transporting electricity (Trade B), e.g. if pij,gt > pi
PS,p
t > pi
i,g
t . In
these situations, there will be implicit subsidies to the gas market, as trades
that should be done transporting gas are done transporting electricity.
Moreover, from the example above, it is possible to design the complementary
case: power transmission is given without representation of players' locational
preferences but gas transmission is optimally priced. In this case, considering
the power-system equivalent to postage stamp pricing, we will ﬁnd analogous
eﬀects.
In general, the particular combination of eﬀects depends on the pricing sys-
tems of each market. Nonetheless, any solution diﬀerent of the optimal one
9Note that we are not considering transmission tariﬀs but only short-term pricing of
transmission capacity.
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will result in some level of subsidization of one market to the other. There-
fore, when some transmission services are oﬀered without preferences repre-
sentation, the use of the network is not optimal. This in turn implies cross-
subsidies from one market (the market using more network capacity than in
the optimal solution) to the other.
4.2. Measures affecting the allocation of line-pack storage
In the following example, together with results R1G and R1P, we will apply
Result 3 :
(R3G: Result 3Gas market)
The price of storing gas in the pipelines connected to i at time t will be
denoted by µi,L,pt . Using (Result 3 ) and assuming no congestion in the gas
network, the line-pack price is given by the price diﬀerence at node i between
two consecutive periods, µi,L,pt = pi
i,p
t+1 − pii,pt .
Let us consider again two situations.
(Trade C): The ﬁrst situation consists in:
• A power producer buys gas at node i and time t at a price given by
the marginal bid at the auction:
∂Ci,∗t
∂W i,∗t
• After that, the power producer store the gas in the pipelines connected
to node i until the next period t+ 1. The price for such trade is given
by the value of line-pack storage determined by the gas auction (we
assume that the pipeline is not congested): µi,L,gt
• Finally, the power producer sells electricity produced with the gas at
node i and time t+ 1:
∂Oi,∗t+1
∂P i,∗t+1
The unit revenue (assuming that the heat rate of the plant is equal to one)
of the set of trades is thus given by
unit revenue(C) = − ∂C
i,∗
t
∂W i,∗t
− µi−j,L,gt +
∂Oi,∗t+1
∂P i,∗t+1
Using the previous results R1G, R3G and R1P in the expression for the unit
revenue, we have that
unit revenue(C) = pii,pt+1 − pii,gt+1
(Trade D): The second situation consists in:
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• The same power producer buys gas at node i and time t+ 1: ∂C
i,∗
t+1
∂W i,∗t+1
• The power producer then produce electricity at the same node i and
time t+ 1:
∂Oi,∗t+1
∂P i,∗t+1
The unit revenue (assuming that the heat rate of the plant is equal to one)
of the set of trades is thus given by
unit revenue(D) = − ∂C
i,∗
t
∂W i,∗t
+
∂Oi,∗t+1
∂P i,∗t+1
Using R1G, R3G and R1P,
unit revenue(D) = pii,pt+1 − pii,gt+1
Therefore, if line-pack is priced according to players' bids for gas commodity,
the two trades are equivalent.
Suboptimal line-pack pricing. Consider that no line-pack constraint is
considered when clearing the market. A typical example of this is found in
the EU gas markets. As shown in section2, European markets often provides
network users temporal ﬂexibility. For instance, the implementation of a
daily balancing mechanisms implies that line-pack storage is used by TSOs
to balance the system within the day. Consequently, line-pack storage is given
for free. Thus, the Trade C will have a unit revenue given by
unit revenue(C,DB) = − ∂C
i,∗
t
∂W i,∗t
+
∂Oi,∗t+1
∂P i,∗t+1
= pii,pt+1 − pii,gt
and Trade D will have
unit revenue(D,DB) = pii,pt+1 − pii,gt+1
because now storing gas inside the pipeline is free. If pii,gt < pi
i,g
t+1, then
the revenue associated with the Trade C is higher under a daily balancing
mechanism than in the optimal pricing scheme.
4.2.1. General lessons from the example
In the example considered above, as Trade C is less costly under a daily
balancing mechanism, there will be more trades using line-pack storage than
in the optimal solution. On the other hand, it is possible that pii,gt > pi
i,g
t+1,
so the revenue of Trade C under a daily balancing would be lower than in
the optimal pricing scheme. This in turn implies that players would be using
less line-pack storage than in the optimal solution. But players' revenues
14
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would not change with respect to the optimal outcome, because the revenue
associated with Trade D remains the same.
Assuming perfect foresight (we are not considering players' behavior under
uncertainty), shippers will store gas in the periods when the gas price is low,
in order to use it in the periods when the gas price is high. The general eﬀect
of free line-pack storage is to increase players' revenues, as their gas trades
are cheaper when it is proﬁtable to store gas, and they cost the same when
storing gas is not proﬁtable.
Therefore, under free line-pack storage, there will be more trades using line-
pack than in the solution of the eﬃcient auction. This implies that the part
of the gas market that is not using line-pack is subsidizing the power market,
because there are cheaper gas trades paid for by all gas network users.
4.3. Free line-pack storage affects the use of transmission
So far we have dealt with suboptimal pricing of transmission and line-pack
storage separately. However, the eﬀects of the two pricing schemes are not
independent. When line-pack is free in one node but costly in other node,
it has implications for the transmission results. A ﬁrst eﬀect can be de-
rived from the optimality conditions of the auction (see equation (B.2) in
the Appendix): more line-pack oﬀer implies less transmission capacity. But
we are interested in cross-industry eﬀects. In this regard, free line-pack ser-
vices aﬀects whether market participants are using gas transmission or power
transmission.
4.3.1. An example
Let us consider again the two previous situations in section 4.1, but adding
the eﬀects of line-pack. We had that, in the eﬃcient solution,
unit revenue A (transport by gas) = pij,pt+1 − pij,gt+1
unit revenue B (transport by power) = pii,pt+1 − pii,gt+1
Now consider that node j is oﬀering free line-pack services and that pij,gt+1 >
pij,gt :
unit revenue A (transport by gas) = pij,pt+1 − pij,gt
Gas transmission becomes cheaper, even if gas transmission is priced accord-
ing to players' preferences.
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4.3.2. General lessons from the example
In the example above, more transport will be done using the gas network
than in the optimal solution. And the eﬀect is not related to the particu-
lar transmission pricing scheme, but to the line-pack pricing. Hence, network
users will use more gas transmission when gas storage makes it proﬁtable, in-
creasing their revenues. When gas storage is not proﬁtable, players' revenues
will remain the same.
The general eﬀect is that, regardless the transmission pricing scheme, giving
free line-pack storage aﬀects the use of transmission. Thus, besides the cross-
subsidies described in section 4.2, free line-pack implies using, on average,
more gas transmission than in the optimal auction.
5. Long-term signals in the interaction between gas
and power market designs
The previous section has shown that the operation of gas (power) markets
is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the operation of power (gas) markets. As such
operation depends in turn on the design of the markets, the previous section
described some interactions between gas and power market designs in the
short run. In particular, we identiﬁed that
• Providing transmission rights without representation of market pref-
erences implies aﬀecting the choice of which commodity will be trans-
ported (section 4.1)
• Providing free line-pack storage services implies subsidizing the power
market (section 4.2)
• Providing free line-pack storage aﬀects the choice of the transported
commodity (section 4.3)
The previous short-term eﬀects also constitute relevant signals for the invest-
ment in power plants. To analyze these eﬀects, we consider several intercon-
nected systems with diﬀerent degrees of spatial and temporal ﬂexibility for
both gas and power commodities. In doing so, we will be able to characterize
the kinds of eﬀects found in the interaction among diﬀerent market designs.
In that view, it is useful to consider a set of cross-system trades.
5.1. Cross-border trading and infrastructure allocation
The basic scenario consists in two interconnected national (or sub-national)
zones for each market (gas and power). Such zones are rarely under a single
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regulatory frame, so trades must be coordinated according to each of the
national set of rules. Hence, we describe a certain national system as a set
of nodes in the single-auction representation. We will call this set of nodes
a trading zone. The interconnection would be deﬁned by (gas and power)
transmission and line-pack services of a set of lines connecting the relevant
set of nodes. We will consider two basic cases: lack of coordination in the
allocation of transmission capacity between two zones, and diﬀerent levels of
free line-pack services in the two trading zones.
We identify the lack of tight coordination between zones with a case of
more expensive transmission rights than the optimal value. This relies on
a transaction cost argument. Lack of tight coordination often means the
use of explicit network allocation. That is, players must purchase rights to
transport gas or power through the network, besides trading gas or power
commodity. Both gas and power markets, because of their complex technical
characteristics, are faced by stringent time constraints. In that view, players
would need to trade a large amount of services in a very short period. This
is associated with signiﬁcant transaction costs. We model such transaction
costs by deﬁning transmission services more expensive than in the single-
auction representation. Hence, lack of tight coordination results in the eﬀects
described in section 4.1.
On the other hand, as a trading zone could be identiﬁed with a set of net-
work nodes, it is possible to model diﬀerent rules for line-pack allocation in
diﬀerent trading zones. In that view, the oﬀer of free line-pack storage would
be constrained to a certain set of nodes (possibly a single node), whereas
line-pack storage in the rest of nodes is priced at the eﬃcient value.
If a certain combination of designs is more beneﬁcial in one trading zone than
in another, it will constitute a localization signal for gas-ﬁred power plants.
In our discussion, we are only taking into account the relative conditions in
two zones: the objective is to analyze the consequences of diﬀerent incentives
to invest in one of the two zones due to the conditions of use for gas-ﬁred
power plants. For instance, if the allocation of line-pack storage in the gas
market design results in lower costs in a certain trading zone, gas-ﬁred power
plants will have an incentive to invest in that trading zone. Analogously, if
the transmission services allocation results in lower costs in a certain zone,
that will be an additional localization signal.
The previous heterogeneity results in long-term signals associated with the
interaction of both market designs. Next sections are devoted to describe
long-term eﬀects of such interactions.
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5.2. Free temporal flexibility may weaken localization
signals for power plants investment
Consider two zones with diﬀerent needs for power ﬂexibility. The typical sit-
uation is a zone with signiﬁcant presence of wind production and another
zone with more constant generation patterns10. Under the auction repre-
sentation, the zones will have signals for gas-ﬁred power plants investment.
In particular, high prices for short-term generation of the zone with high
penetration of wind power should attract gas-ﬁred power plants.
However, we have to consider also the temporal ﬂexibility (free line-pack
storage services) provided by the gas system. Gas-ﬁred power plants will have
lower costs in zones with less gas constraints. Let us assume that temporal
ﬂexibility is lower in the zone with the largest share of intermittent generation
(zone A) and higher in the system with the smallest share of intermittent
generation (zone B). The reduced costs associated with temporal ﬂexibility
may be associated with the eﬀects described in section 4.2.
The artiﬁcially cheap gas prices for ﬂexible use of the network will then
attract investment in power plants to zone B, which has relatively low needs
of them. The only solution for the zone with large needs of gas-ﬁred power
plants (zone A) is to buy short-term electricity from the zone with free
storage services (zone B). This will create a clear signal for investment in
the power network.
In this situation even if the power market design is providing the correct long-
term signals, lack of harmonization in the designs of gas markets creates the
need for power network investment. That need would not exist if the gas rules
were harmonized. Moreover, large temporal ﬂexibility is fading localization
signals for gas-ﬁred power plants.
5.3. Free spatial flexibility may weaken localization signals
for power plants investment
Usually, in order to analyze the localization signals for power plants, one
pays attention to the signals given by power prices. In that view, gas-ﬁred
power plants earn the eﬃcient price when selling electricity, and hence they
receive eﬃcient localization signals. For instance, if there is one zone with
higher price (the interconnection is congested), power plants see a short-term
signal to invest in such zone, and thus to help removing the congestion. Such
price diﬀerences are described by the clearing conditions of the auction.
10The presence of wind production increases the need for back-up generation, which in
turn increases the uncertainty and variability of gas-ﬁred power plants consumption
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But we observe that, regardless the design of power markets, the design of
gas markets also gives signals to the localization of gas-ﬁred power plants.
We showed in sections 4.1 and 4.3 that aﬀecting transmission prices in one
market aﬀected transmission prices in the other. As transmission prices are
aﬀected, long-term signals are aﬀected as well.
Consider a case where two trading zones are not tightly coordinated (assum-
ing tight coordination deﬁned by any mechanism equivalent to the auction
representation, e.g. market coupling). If the zones are not tightly coordi-
nated, there may be an ineﬃcient price diﬀerence between two zones. This
results in a situation where gas purchases for power generation are cheaper
than the optimal solution in one of the zones, and this constitutes a long-term
signal.
One possible case is that the gas price is lower than the optimal solution in
the zone with low power prices. In this case, even when the power market
design is giving the correct long-term signals, such signals may be hidden by
an ineﬃcient gas price. If the ineﬃciency in the gas pricing is signiﬁcant, one
will observe gas-ﬁred power plants investing in zones with low power price.
In this situation, the signals from the gas market design are contributing to
increase congestion in the power interconnection.
5.4. Lack of harmonization may raise barriers to network
investment
Rious et al. (2011) described the investment in power networks as an antic-
ipation problem. They described the investment in power networks related
to the planner's expectations regarding the future needs of network. Such
needs were related to the investment in generation plants. It is possible to
use a similar reasoning for the analysis of the interaction between investment
in gas and power networks. In that view, the expected localization of gas-
ﬁred power plants will aﬀect the investment in both power and gas networks.
And as showed above, such localization is aﬀected by the combination of gas
and power market designs. Therefore, the deﬁnition of the costs of gas-ﬁred
power plants implicit in the market design creates a link between investment
in power and gas networks.
However, it is not clear whether power investments should anticipate gas
investments or the other way around. A typical situation for investment needs
created by the link between two markets is that both networks see advantages
in a wait and see strategy, so that there is an incentive to delay network
investment. Such incentive is less relevant when one of the two investment
signals (gas or power networks) are strong enough or independent from the
other market. But when needs for investments are created artiﬁcially in one
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market, they may delay investments in the other market.
Consider the situations described in sections 4.1 and 4.3. For instance, let us
assume that gas storage is cheaper in one zone (zone A) than in the other
(zone B), everything else being the same. Let us also consider that electricity
prices are lower in zone A. On the one hand, one could invest in the power
network, building interconnection from zone A to zone B. One should then
expect more investment in gas-ﬁred power plants in the cheap-gas zone and
observe exports of power from zone A to zone B. On the other hand, the
gas network could be developed to provide cheap gas from zone A to power
plants in zone B. The two situations show incentives for investment in gas
networks from A to B and for investment in power networks from A to B.
The question thus is what to build. Consider that the power network is built
ﬁrst, so that energy is transported from A to B through the power network.
There is a strong signal for power plant investment in the zone A (where the
gas is more ﬂexible). The gas price would increase enough, potentially enough
to eliminate the interest of gas network investment. Consider otherwise: in-
vestment in the gas network takes place ﬁrst, so that energy is transported
from A to B through the gas network. In this case, there is a strong signal
to invest in the zone with high power price (zone B), as gas prices are now
more similar in the two zones. This eventually reduces power prices in zone
B so that, after the investment in the gas network, it is possible that the
power network investment is not proﬁtable anymore.
The two previous cases show an incentive for the network planner to wait-
and-see in order to observe the decisions of the other network. The situation
was in turn created by artiﬁcial gas price diﬀerences, which were locational
signals. As the initial network needs does not reﬂect the real network capac-
ity (zone A has artiﬁcial cheap gas network prices), one observes an artiﬁ-
cial need for gas network investment, which eﬀectively competes with power
network investments. Such artiﬁcial needs may delay investments in power
networks, and hence result in barriers to network investment.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the short-term interaction of market arrange-
ments in power and gas systems. We have shown that several regulatory
measures that aﬀect the eﬃciency of one market also aﬀect the other. The
methodology used to study such interactions was based on the statement
of an auction representation. By deﬁning eﬃcient operation as the results
of such auctions, we have shown that the rules of each market constrain
the possible eﬃciency of the other market. This paper showed that provid-
ing transmission or line-pack rights without representation of market pref-
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erences implies aﬀecting the choice of the commodity actually transported.
In addition, this paper showed that providing free line-pack services implies
subsidizing the power market.
Moreover, we have shown that the design of short-term operation has a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the resulting long-term signals. In particular, we showed
that free gas ﬂexibility and free transmission services may weaken localiza-
tion signals for power plants investment. Finally, we showed that lack of
harmonization between market designs may raise barriers to network invest-
ment. Therefore, when analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent designs,
the cross-industry eﬀects must be taken into account.
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Appendix
A. Allocation of network services through day-ahead
auctions
A.1. A clearing algorithm for power markets
The algorithm for an implicit power auction is based on using nodal pricing
models to clear the auction. The logic for the approach is to represent, by
means of a simpliﬁed model of the operation of the power network, the opti-
mal allocation of power ﬂows implicit in players' bids for power commodity.
Consider a system made up of i = 1, ..., N nodes and j = 1, ...,M power
lines. Let us denote (the transpose of a certain matrix A is denoted by AT ):
• Pt =
(
P 1t . . . P
N
t
)T
is the (column) vector of power productions at
each network node at time t. Ot(Pt) is the vector of production oﬀers
at each node i and time t.
• Dt =
(
D1t . . . D
N
t
)T
is the vector of power demands at each network
node at time t. Ut(Dt) is the vector of demand utilities at each network
node at time t
• fpowert =
(
fp,1t . . . f
p,M
t
)T
is the vector of power ﬂows through each
power line of the system at time t
• Mp is the incidence matrix: the elementMpi,j is 1 if the line j is leaving
the node i, −1 if the line is arriving at the point, and zero otherwise
• Fp is the matrix relating ﬂows through the power line and its phase
diﬀerential. We use a DC representation
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• θt =
(
θ1t . . . θ
N
t
)T
is the vector of voltage phases at each network
node at time t. We will choose the ﬁrst node as the slack bus, so that
θ1t = 0
In order to clear the auction, the auctioneer must take into account the
system constraints. Power networks, however, are characterized by consid-
erably non-linear equations. We will thus consider a DC linearization of the
problem. Thus, the constraints are:
• The energy balance at each node
Pt = Dt +Mpfpt
• The DC ﬂow model
fpt = Fpθt
• The ﬂow limits of power lines
fm,pt ≤ fpt ≤ fM,pt
With the previous notation, the total social surplus can be written as∑
t
(Ot(Pt)− Ut(Dt))
Therefore, the clearing algorithm can be represented by
max
Pt,Dt,f
p
t ,θt
∑
t
(Ot(Pt)− Ut(Dt))
s.t. Pt = Dt +Mpfpt : µprice,pt
fpt = Fpθt : µF,pt
fm,pt ≤ fpt ≤ fM,pt : µm,pt , µM,pt
A.2. A clearing algorithm for gas markets
The algorithm for an implicit gas auction that takes into account the line-
pack is close to the reasoning of combinatorial auctions for electricity mar-
kets, see Vazquez and Hallack (2012). The logic for the application to short-
term gas markets is to represent, by means of a simpliﬁed model of the op-
eration of the gas network, the optimal allocation of gas ﬂows and line-pack
storage implicit in the players' bids for gas commodity.
In that view, the objective function of the optimization of the network ser-
vices will be to maximize the social beneﬁt. Consider a certain system made
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up of i = 1, . . . , N entry/exit points (we assume, for the sake of simplic-
ity, that entry/exit points are the same as the power network nodes) and
j = 1, . . . ,M pipelines. Let us denote (the transpose of a certain matrix A
is denoted by AT ):
• It =
(
I1t . . . I
N
t
)T
is the (column) vector of injections at each en-
try/exit point at time t. Bt(It) is the vector of injection oﬀers at each
entry/exit point i and time t.
• Wt =
(
W 1t . . . W
N
t
)T
is the vector of withdrawals at each entry/exit
point at time t. Ct(Wt) is the vector of withdrawal oﬀers at each en-
try/exit point at time t
• fgt =
(
fg,1t . . . f
g,M
t
)T
is the vector of gas ﬂows through the pipelines
of the system at time t
• lt =
(
l1t . . . l
N
t
)T
is the vector of line-pack storage at each network
point at time t
• Mg is the incidence matrix: elementMgi,j is equal to 1 if the pipeline
j is leaving the point i, −1 if the line is arriving at the point, and zero
otherwise
• Fgf is the matrix relating ﬂows through pipelines to their pressure dif-
ferential
• Fgl is the matrix relating line-pack storage in pipelines to their pressure
diﬀerential
• Lg = MgFgl is the matrix relating line-pack storage at each node to
pressure diﬀerentials in all pipelines connected to the point
• pt =
(
p1t . . . p
N
t
)T
is the vector of pressures at each entry/exit point
at time t.
In order to clear the auction, the auctioneer must take into account the sys-
tem constraints. Gas networks are also characterized by non-linear equations.
If such physical characteristics are fully represented, there will be no linear
price that clears the auction. We thus consider a linearization of the prob-
lem, so that both transmission capacity and line-pack storage are related to
pressures through linear functions. In that view, the constraints that we are
considering are:
• The energy balance at each entry/exit point
lt = It −Wt +Mgfgt + lt−1
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• The ﬂow and line-pack deﬁnition in terms of nodes' pressure
fgt = Fgf pt
lt = Lgpt
• The pressure limits of pipelines
pmt ≤ pt ≤ pMt
With the previous notation, the total social surplus can be written as∑
t
(Bt(It)− Ct(Wt))
Therefore, the clearing algorithm can be represented by
max
It,Wt,f
g
t ,lt,pt
∑
t
(Bt(It)− Ct(Wt))
s.t. lt = It −Wt +Mgfgt + lt−1 : µprice,gt
fgt = Fgf pt : µF,gt
lt = Lgpt : µL,gt
pmt ≤ pt ≤ pMt : µm,gt , µM,gt
This auction mechanism is not intended to represent in full detail physical
ﬂows, but to separate the network services required to adjust shippers' port-
folios from the complex technical characteristics that will be managed by the
TSO.
B. Optimality conditions and transmission pricing
B.1. Allocation of power network services
In order to understand the functioning of the auction, it is useful to ana-
lyze its clearing conditions. They are given by the optimality conditions of
the clearing algorithm. The optimality conditions for the previous program
yields:
(Optimality of Pt) :
∂Ot(Pt)
∂Pt
= µprice,pt (1)
(Optimality of Dt) :
∂Ut(Dt)
∂Dt
= µprice,pt (2)
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These two equations simply say that the marginal utility of production is
equal to the marginal utility of consumption, and both are deﬁned by µprice,pt .
Hence, the uniform of this auction pipt would be equal to the multiplier µ
price,p
t .
In that view, the price makes the marginal utility of production equal to the
marginal utility of consumption.
(Optimality of fpt ) : MT,pµprice,pt − µF,pt + (µM,pt − µm,pt ) = 0 (3)
This equation gives the value of transmission along the whole network. It is
expressed by means of the price diﬀerences among network nodes at a certain
point in time.
(Optimality of θt) : FpµF,pt = 0 (4)
In addition, in order to solve the mathematical program, we need the con-
straints and the complementarity conditions:
(Power balance) : Pt = Dt +Mpfpt (5)
(DC power flow) : fpt = Fpθt (6)
(Minimum flow) : (−fM,pt − fpt ) ⊥ µm,pt (7)
(Maximum flow) : (fpt − fM,pt ) ⊥ µM,pt (8)
B.2. Allocation of gas network services
Again, auction clearing conditions are given by the optimality conditions of
the clearing algorithm. The optimality conditions for the previous program
yields:
(Optimality of It) :
∂Bt(It)
∂It
= µprice,gt (9)
(Optimality of Wt) :
∂Ct(Wt)
∂Wt
= µprice,gt (10)
Along the same lines as in the power-market auction, these two equations
say that the marginal utility of production is equal to the marginal utility
of consumption, and both are deﬁned by µprice,gt . Hence, the uniform price
of this auction pigt would be equal to the multiplier µ
price,g
t . As in the case of
power auctions, the price makes the marginal utility of production equal to
the marginal utility of consumption.
In addition,
(Optimality of fgt ) : MT,gµprice,gt − µF,gt = 0 (11)
(12)
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(Optimality of lt) : µ
price,g
t+1 − µprice,gt − µL,gt = 0 (13)
These two equations give the value of transmission and line-pack storage
along the whole gas network. The former is expressed by means of the price
diﬀerences among network nodes at a certain point in time, and the latter is
expressed by the price diﬀerence, between two consecutive periods, at each
network node.
In that view, the clearing algorithm is intended to decide how to determine
the matching among bids at diﬀerent network nodes and points in time.
These two equations describe the procedure to deﬁne the values for line-
pack and transmission in order to compare such bids.
(Optimality of pt) : FT,gf µF,gt + LT,gµL,gt + (µM,gt − µm,gt ) = 0 (14)
In order to solve the mathematical program, we need the constraints and the
complementarity conditions:
(Gas balance) : lt = It −Wt +Mgfgt + lt−1 (15)
(Flow − pressure) : fgt = Fgf pt (16)
(Line pack − pressure) : lt = Lgpt (17)
(Minimum flow) : (pmt − pt) ⊥ µm,gt (18)
(Maximum flow) : (pt − pMt ) ⊥ µM,gt (19)
The trade-oﬀ between line-pack storage and transmission services is relevant
in our analysis. To analyze how line-pack storage is priced, consider that we
do not have congestion, so
FT,gf µF,gt = −LT,gµL,gt
On the one hand, using equation (13), we have that
−LT,gµL,gt = LT,g(µprice,gt+1 − µprice,gt )
and
µF,gt =MT,gµprice,gt
On the other, the uniform price of the auction is deﬁned by pigt = µ
price,g
t .
Hence, the previous clearing condition can be written as
FT,gf pigt = LT,g(pigt+1 − pigt )
The left-hand side of the equation represents the value of transmission along
the network. The right-hand side of the equation gives the value of the
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line-pack. Therefore, the algorithm clears the auction in order to make the
marginal utility of transmission equal to the marginal utility of line-pack.
Such marginal utilities are represented by oﬀers of gas injections and with-
drawals. From the viewpoint of players' bids, the choice between line-pack
and transmission is done implicitly in their oﬀers for gas commodity injec-
tions and withdrawals in the diﬀerent hours of a day.
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